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1 Executive Summary
Major Achievements
• Design and development of a complement to STORK whose function is to
– integrate arbitrary identities, token and federation technologies beyond just govern-
ment notified eIDs
– create an open market for governmental and private-sector intermediation services
that stimulates efficiency, quality of service and innovation through competition and
is designed for long-term economic sustainability
– support service providers who already have an installed base of their own credentials
– help the adoption of STORK in the private sector
• Pioneer the first practical architecture and technology for very large-scale
meta-federation featuring
– architecture without any need for central components or restrictions on possible
topologies
– interoperability across federation dialects
– an architecture and trust infrastructure that concurrently supports multiple percep-
tions of trust
– user-centric and privacy-friendly information flows
– accountability and privacy-friendly logging
– support for chains of intermediaries
– patterns to avoid profiling of users
– possibility of abstract in multiple steps from the complexity of participating federa-
tions and trust domains
• Detailed legal study of large-scale identity management issues
• Integration of the requirement of a wide range of non-technical disciplines including legal,
socio-economic aspect, privacy, usability, and inclusion into its architecture and implemen-
tation.
Remaining Gaps
• mature open source version of all components
• formal standardization
• easier to use identity selector that
– supports user-enforced privacy and
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– scales to the enormous number of possible credentials of a very large-scale deployment
without losing ease of use.
• implementation and integration of new key-based FutureID federation protocol in sup-
port of accountability and privacy-friendly logging, including its integration with current
browsers
• Research on how to render FutureID highly resilient.
Overall Recommendations
• Foster the long-term sustainability of the FutureID results beyond the duration of the
project.
• Use eSENS to further mature FutureID components, particularly the open source versions.
• Integrate FutureID into CEF as a complement to STORK for reaching out to the private
sector and services that need to integrate non-notified electronic identities.
• Support research and development to fill the gaps identified by FutureID that are necessary
for operational use at very large scales.
• Promote FutureID as the first generic solution for very large-scale identity management:
– beyond Europe by:
∗ engaging with North-America and other regions in a discussion of a common
vision and conceptual framework for global identity-management
∗ support of international standardization of FutureID concepts and technologies
∗ foster a global open-source community around an open source reference imple-
mentation of FutureID
– to the Private Sector by:
∗ providing an off-the-shelf open source solution based on FutureID and STORK
for service providers who need support for notified and additional eIDs
∗ support high-profile champions to deploy and demonstrate FutureID technology
∗ create awareness of the opportunity of providing commercial intermediation ser-
vices and its market potential
Legal Recommendations
• National eIDs should be usable also in the private sector. For this purpose, appropriate
legislation is needed.
• A system such as FutureID should be used for data minimization and pseudonymous
(service-specific) identifiers, particularly in private sector use.
• The use of non-notified eIDs is important and should be supported by legislation (e.g.
determine application of the eIDAS Regulation concerning assessment of the level of as-
surance).
• Standard contractual clauses should be developed that regulate responsibilities of parties
in large-scale identity management systems.
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• With respect to the eTrust Services regulated in the eIDAS Regulation, a legal obligation
for Member States to introduce these services should be considered.
• The interoperability framework introduced by the eIDAS Regulation needs to be ready to
process any kind of data in a lawful way. With respect to sensitive data this will require
the system’s ability to provide end-to-end-encryption.
• Privacy by design is an important principle, which needs, however, to be more defined.
An approach to list concrete requirements has been elaborated in D22.3.
• In (privacy-friendly) decentralized systems is it necessary to ensure appropriate liability
allocation/redress mechanisms. Legally essential evidence preservation can be done via a
privacy friendly logging solution, that allows finding the liable party.
Research Recommendations
• Transfer results and insights of FutureID into other domains, such as the Internet of things.
• Adaptation and Integration of FutureID result and components into complex interorgani-
zational systems such as Fraunhofer’s “Industrial Data Space”.
• Qualitative and quantitative research on socio-economic aspects of federations and the
sustainable evolution of ecosystems of very large-scale identity management systems.
• Privacy-preserving identity federation and attribute-based authentication are key research
areas to pursue and substantiate.
• As outlined in the legal recommendations, the research and technical primitives enabled
by it should enable strong end-to-end privacy-by-design.
• FutureID identified the privacy-preserving accountability as a key research area to follow
from the advances made in privacy preserving audits.
• Substantial research and development into highly resilient and fault-tolerant identity fed-
eration systems is required.
• Future identity federation systems should be established on a trusted computing base and
attestation to protect their integrity and demonstrate it to others.
Roadmap
FutureID has been highly successful and has produced a wealth of important results. The fol-
lowing describes how to use the FutureID results to roll out a Europe-wide identity management
system in support of the single market of services.
• open source reference implementation of all components
• formal standardization of protocols
• fill the identified gaps to support operational use at very large scales:
– new, key-based federation protocols that support accountability, privacy-friendly log-
ging, and strong security
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– easy to use identity selector that empowers users to control the authentication process
and enforce their own privacy
• first high-profile deployments of the technology:
– service providers who need to support additional credentials in addition to those
supported by STORK
– academic networks such as Geant with its eduroam
– meta-federations in fields such as banking or automotive operated by existing orga-
nizations dealing with inter-banking issues or industry-wide data and trust networks.
• encourage uptake by software industry and integrators to implement the new FutureID
standard in commercial products
• build a FutureID community beyond Europe
– The United States government is currently looking to develop a vision and conceptual
framework for very large-scale (and potentially global) identity management
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3 Introduction
This deliverable offers recommendations and identifies areas of future work after the comple-
tion of FutureID. The executive summary in the beginning of this deliverable highlights the
most important points, whereas the body of the document provides supporting evidence and
arguments.
3.1 Methodology
The work for this deliverable was facilitated with an interdisciplinary group of researchers,
including the FutureID technical coordinator and experts in security, privacy, legal aspects and
technical realisation of reference implementation and pilots.
The work of this deliverable followed a staged bottom-up approach. First, we analysed the
outcomes of FutureID as expressed in the different evaluation deliverables, D12.1-D12.8. We
considered the requirements originally proposed for the respective areas and the immediate
outcome of the evaluation. From these observations, we derived lessons learnt, future work
and a projection towards key stakeholders. This bottom-up work yields the Section Section 7,
which in turn includes dedicated sections for the overall project lessons learnt, security, privacy,
usability, socio-economic and legal lessons learnt. The remaining gaps of FutureID are founded
in this evaluation.
We decided to establish dedicated broader lessons learnt for two key areas: Section 5 and Sec-
tion 8. These evaluations were performed by legal and research experts respectively, considering
observation made throughout the project. Hence, Section 5 contains expert recommendations
on the legal environment of FutureID and identity federation, in general. Legal implications are
naturally focused on policy and law makers.
Section 8 evaluates the advances made in the research of WP2.4 and identifies which research
areas have shown to be promising or feasible. This yields recommendations for promising areas
of future work, which could be included in future EU projects.
Separately from the investigation of lessons learnt and implications in these areas, we took a
strategic perspective for FutureID as a whole. This perspective is taken into account in two ways.
First, we identified the strategic benefits of FutureID as a paradigm as well as as a reference
architecture with a set of components. The strategic benefits are grounded in a bottom-up
analysis, collecting outcomes of the exploitation plan, the benefits of individual components,
and benefits for stakeholders. Subsequently, we established strategic benefits with a high-level
perspective. Section 6 contains the outcome of this analysis.
Secondly, we identified key characteristics of large-scale identity federation systems that are
to thrive in actual markets. These key characteristics are influenced by the socio-economic
evaluation, but also by the overall experience gathered throughout the project. Section 4 outlines
these characteristics concisely.
Finally, we synthesised recommendations and future work proposals from this process, especially
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a roadmap ahead.
3.2 Organisation
As a principle, this document is structured such that the most important information comes first
and more detailed supporting evidence is provided subsequently. The reason for this structure
is that key insights can be accessed quickly.
Hence, this deliverable starts with three high-level strategic analyses of identity management
in the spirit of FutureID. Section 4 takes the lead. Whereas the key characteristics focus on
technical and socio-economic characteristics, the following Section 5 offers the legal analysis for
large-scale identity management and what legal frameworks need to be in place to enable those
systems. Section 6 follows this argument, outlining the strategic benefits of FutureID.
The following two sections substantiate the argument, with more fine-grained Section 7 and
Section 8. The lessons learnt section targets stakeholders establishing similar projects, that is
identity and service providers as well as industry, considering a variety of angles from over-
all project management to requirements domains. The research implications target academic
stakeholders, highlighting research outcomes and open questions to pursue.
This deliverable closes with forward-looking Section 9 and Section 10.
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4 Key Characteristics of Large-Scale Identity Management in
Support of a Single Market
Based on the experience of the FutureID project, the following section describes key character-
istics of solutions for very large-scale identity management in support of a (single) market of
online services. The recommendations are abstracted from FutureID itself but contain a status
section that states FutureID’s contribution.
4.1 Reuse of all Existing Momentum, Initiatives, Infrastructure, and Tech-
nology
Considering the daunting effort of a very large-scale identity management system, the only
realistic way of implementation is to reuse existing initiatives, infrastructures, technologies,
identities and momentum as much as possible. While this support of legacy complicates the
system from a technical point of view, it significantly eases the much more challenging task of
actually getting electronic identities used by a large number of users and service providers.
Status: FutureID is designed to integrate all existing assets while keeping the way open to
incorporate cutting-edge and revolutionary technologies such as the privacy-friendly attribute-
based credentials.
4.2 Reaching Critical Mass through Intermediation
The possibly most critical success factor for a large scale identity management system is its
(voluntary) uptake by users and service providers. The very best system fails if it is not used. To
be worth-while, the system needs to offer a critical mass of services to users and of potential users
to service providers, respectively. This can be reached through (a) component(s) (sometimes
called hubs, proxies, gateways, or brokers) that interface between diverse electronic identities
and identity providers on one hand and service providers on the other. The intermediary takes
care of the complexity of diverse technologies, trust levels, etc. and renders participation easy
for identity and service providers.
Status: FutureID is designed to implement the intermediation pattern.
4.3 Need for a Competitive Market for Services that Compose the Overall
System
A long-term sustainable solution must remain cost-effective, provide high-quality service to all
stakeholders, incorporate new and innovative technologies, adapt to special needs of stakeholders,
and cater to branch-specific and niche-markets. This is only achievable if there are multiple
vendors for each system component and service. Most prominently, vendors include identity
providers and intermediation service providers.
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Status: The FutureID architecture supports an open marketplace of such services by avoiding
the need for central components and control or a fixed topology of intermediaries and providing
an auto-configuration when new services enter the market place. The avoidance of any centralized
component or registration is crucial to prevent restrictions of free market forces.
4.4 Need to Support Diverse Perceptions of Trust while still Sharing Infras-
tructure Components
Perception of trust is closely linked to the perception of risk. Different entrepreneurs from differ-
ent business-sectors, operating in different locations, and addressing different market segments
cannot possibly agree on a single shared perception of trust. Trust fails to scale. Legal certainty
that may apply to a whole region (e.g., eIDAS in Europe) is only one of many aspects of trust
and fails to scale beyond the boundaries of the region while processes of the market are typically
global.
A successful large-scale identity management system therefore needs to be able to support mul-
tiple perceptions of trust while still permitting the sharing of identities and identity services
among stakeholders with different perceptions of trust.
Status: The FutureID architecture allows trust-perception-specific intermediaries to combine
existing identities and identity providers in different ways from other intermediaries. The Fu-
tureID trust infrastructure was specifically designed to support diverse perceptions of trust and
different trust assessments of the same identities and identity services.
4.5 Need to be Designed as an Open System
In order to be successful, a large-scale identity management system must be able to incorporate
new initiatives, stakeholders, and technologies as they evolve. Failing to do so would create
competing efforts that contradict the objective of reaching a critical mass. Failing to incorporate
innovative new technologies would also render the solution obsolete.
Status: FutureID is designed as an open system that can incorporate new technologies (as
demonstrated with Attribute-Based Credentials) and is not threatened by new initiatives such
as FIDO.
4.6 Need for User-Centric Design
To support end user adoption, we recommend that identity federation systems incorporate user-
centric design and that the European Union advocates user-centric design. First, user-interface
design shall take into account the user all the way ensuring usability as key feature through-out.
Second, identity federation systems and deployments for Europe shall support a user-centric
mode of operation, which puts the component that represents the user’s interests in the centre
of transactions. This is a necessary condition for strong privacy-enhancing technologies, such
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as attribute-based authentication, by which architectural design decisions need to enable future
adoption of such technologies.
Status: FutureID is designed to support user-centric operation and has received significant
usability consideration, from the requirements stage onwards.
4.7 Need to Protect Privacy by Design
To protect citizens from identity theft and mass surveillance of organised crime or nation-state ac-
tors, we recommend to make privacy-by-design a priority for identity federation system. Privacy-
by-design provides and overarching framework for integrating privacy and data protection early
and effectively into technologies, organisational processes and networked architectures. It pro-
vides multidisciplinary considerations into
• The right legal framework in the European Union, contractual agreements that highlight
responsibilities of each party within FIM and privacy friendly logging solutions.
• Technical compliance with and beyond principles of data minimisation and purpose limi-
tation as well as protection goals of transparency and intervenability.
• Re-usable software engineering methods that weaves user-centric privacy-by-design within
the system design and development process.
• To enable realisation of legal propositions in practice, privacy should not be considered
separately from privacy during design. User-centric privacy would involve shifting con-
trol to users, who may not always be in a position to fully assess risks. Improving user
experience does not provide a one-size-fits-all solution.
Status: FutureID included privacy principles in its genesis and supports attribute-based authen-
tication. Requirements for privacy-preserving brokering and identity provisioning were included.
4.8 Need for Resilience
Identity federation systems like FutureID stand to become a lynchpin for the digital economy,
its identity backbone. To protect the system and the service providers as well as users who
depend on the identity federation system, identity federation needs to be highly resilient. We
recommend that the European Union makes the research and deployment of highly resilient
identity federation a priority. FutureID’s evaluation highlights three properties to include: a)
privacy-preserving accountability, b) security assurance and system integrity of the identity
federation system itself, and c) dependability and fault tolerance.
Status: FutureID specified requirements for system resilience based on today’s state-of-the-art.
Since out of scope of the DoW, they were not realised in the implementation though. Further
research is required to solve highly resilient identity federation conceptually.
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4.9 Need to Reuse Established Trust and Business Relationships
In many business areas, trust and business relationships to stakeholders with a specific role in
the field have grown over extended periods of time. Prime examples are organizations dealing
with inter-banking tasks or organizations who operate networks and trust frameworks in the
automotive industry. For ease of deployment, uptake, and acceptance, any large-scale identity
management solution should reuse these existing trust relationships and permit the existing
organizations to act as intermediaries or authorities for the definition of trust schemes. By
forcing a replacement of these existing organizations with different stakeholders due to a rigid
topology or architecture would be very time consuming and bear a high risk of failure.
Status: The FutureID architecture avoids placing any restrictions on the topology of interme-
diaries and its open market approach. The infrastructure encourages that already established
organizations act as intermediaries and/or trust scheme authorities.
4.10 Need to Go Beyond Existing Federation Technologies
While a wealth of well-established federation technologies already exist and are implemented
in readily available products, these are insufficient compared to the needs of very large-scale
identity management. The following provides an incomplete list of shortcomings of current
federation technologies:
4.10.1 Need for Privacy-Friendly Information Flows
Current federation technologies have major shortcomings from a privacy point of view. One
of these concerns information flows. When service providers issue an authentication request
to the identity provider/intermediary of their choice, users may not even be aware of being
redirected to another party. They thus lack the possibility of giving preference to the identity
providers/intermediaries they trust and avoid untrusted ones. Users further lack the possibility
to intervene in order to avoid the redirection to an undesired third party. Such a third party,
i.e. and identity provider or intermediary, can learn a lot of privacy-critical meta-information
about the user. For example, it can know who (e.g., established through browser-fingerprinting)
accesses which service when. Third parties that users are forced to visit therefore present a risk
of becoming big brothers. To solve this problem, new federation technologies are required that
give users control of the information flow and let them chose third parties that are trustworthy.
Status: For this reason, FutureID uses a locally installed or server/cloud-based identity selector
that represents and protects the users’ interests. Since this component was not foreseen in the
description of work, only a minimal solution could be implemented in the projects main imple-
mentation. To complement this, research has been conducted that prototyped the possibilities of
privacy-protection and a master thesis was concentrating on the user-interface design to render
this powerful component easy to use and understand by ordinary users. More work is required
to bring this to an operational status.
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4.10.2 Need to Avoid Assertion Formats that Facilitate Profiling
Another shortcoming in privacy protection are bearer assertions that typically contain both,
information about the identity of the user and the intended recipient of the assertion. While the
latter piece of information serves to avoid certain attacks on bearer assertions, listing identity
and the service that consumes the assertion together obviously facilitates the profiling of users.
New federation technologies need to avoid this privacy pitfall.
Status: FutureID has addressed this problem in two ways: (i) It has shown how the “Do
Not Track Pattern” can be applied through the use of two intermediaries (brokers), one of
which knowing the full identity but not the intended service, the second knowing the intended
service but only an unlinkable pseudonymous identity. (ii) DTU has further developed a more
advanced key-based federation protocol that avoids the need of listing intended recipients in
bearer assertions. Both approaches need additional work to come to an operational state.
4.10.3 Importance of Accountability
Liability is an important issue in large-scale identity management. Since authentication in
large-scale (meta-) federations typically involve a number of parties, if something goes wrong,
it becomes crucial to be able to determine which of these parties has failed and is thus liable.
Was it the fault of the credential issuer, of the identity provider, of one of the intermediaries
(brokers, PEPS, etc.), or even of some hostile attacker? Current federation technologies fail to
support this kind of accountability; new technologies are needed that support accountability by
design.
Status: FutureID (DTU and FHG) has designed an advanced federation protocol based on
formal proofs to support accountability.
4.10.4 Privacy-Friendly Logging
Further, identity providers and intermediaries (brokers, PEPS, ...) typically require logging in
order to proof the absence of wrong-doing and thus defend themselves from liability claims.
Storing personal information indefinitely in a log competes with the requirements of privacy
to delete personal data as soon as possible, preferably right after issuing a derived assertion.
Current federation technologies require to choose from privacy-unfriendly logging to protect
against liability claims and privacy-friendly absence of logging that forfeits any protection against
liability claims.
Status: In FutureID, the advanced federation protocol developed by DTU and FHG combines
both, accountability and privacy-friendly logging.
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4.10.5 Need to Support Chains of Multiple Intermediaries
In large-scale identity management systems, intermediation is used as a point of abstraction.
It is used to encapsulate complexity and hide it from users of the intermediation service. This
includes the following:
• Abstraction of multiple (token, authentication, federation) technologies behind a single
interface,
• Classification of a potentially large number of issuers to few levels of assurance according
to a selected trust scheme.
At very large scale, it is unrealistic to expect abstraction to always happen in a single step,
i.e. to assume that there is only a single point of intermediation. New federation protocols are
therefore required that can handle chains of intermediation.
Status: The FutureID architecture foresees the possibility of chaining intermediaries (brokers,
PEPS, etc.). This chain is controlled by the identity selector. Since this requirement was lacking
in the description of work, only the research prototype of the identity selector can handle more
than one intermediary. More work is needed to reach an operational status.
4.10.6 Need to Support Multiple Credential Types and Direct Presentation of
Credential to Service Provider
Certain credential types must be presented directly to the service provider, i.e., without any
intermediary, in order to preserve their key properties. Two examples shall illustrate this:
• Attribute-Based Credentials preserve their unprecedented privacy features only if they are
presented directly to the service provider,
• A translation of an X.509 credential in a bearer assertion by an intermediary drastically
lowers the security level of authentication.
It is therefore beneficial, if service providers can accept certain credentials directly. If they accept
both, directly presented credentials and assertions from intermediaries, they need to maintain
multiple “credential consumers”.
Current federation technologies fail to integrate the possibility of direct presentation of cre-
dentials to service providers. They also limit the kinds of credentials to assertions of a single
federation technology. To support multiple types of credential consumers, including those for
direct presentation, service providers need to offer their own “identity selectors”, leaving users
with an inconsistent experience across services and with different credentials, as well as with
multiple identity selection steps that may be confusing. New federation approaches should inte-
grate the possibility of service providers operating multiple credential consumers in parallel that
are integrated in a single consistent user experience.
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Status: FutureID’s service provider component permits the use of multiple credential consumers
of differing technology that all share the same session concept. FutureID thus also allows direct
presentation of credentials for security or privacy reasons. Direct presentation credentials are
one of the options to chose from in the single identity selector that also handles “federated
credentials”.
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5 Legal Implications
The legal tasks in the FutureID project – from assessing the general legal framework to specific
legal requirements – yielded several remaining open questions and missing instruments in the
existing framework with regard to identity management and authentication mechanisms. In this
section, we strive to collect important aspects from a legal point of view. Not all points can be
solved by lawyers and policy makers (alone), however, this section is to be read as law- (and
policy-)inspired analysis, but addressing all stakeholders of identity management systems. The
findings mostly name the issue and its consequences, before recommending a way to handle it.
This can be a concrete solution but also the recommendation of further research on a specific
topic. As FutureID was dealing with eIDs as well as with electronic signatures, the interpretation
and enforcement of the eIDAS Regulation – entered into force during the project runtime – was
an important point to be discussed. Consequently, many recommendations in this section deal
with the Regulation and its consequences. Others are directly derived from data protection law
and mainly highlight the potential of developed (or upcoming) technical solutions to enhance
the level of data protection in online authentication contexts.
5.1 Use of national eIDs
The focus of national eIDs lies on public services. The eIDAS Regulation allows the cross-border
use of eIDs, but the provisions consider only public services. Therefore it is for the Member State
to decide whether it is possible to use national eIDs for private services, or not. Considering the
costs of the implementation of national eID schemes, and the benefit of the usage of national
eIDs on a broader scale, policy makers should open the possibility to use national eIDs in a
privacy friendly way also for private services. This might require some changes in law and/or
administrative policies.
5.1.1 National Identifiers
However, in this regard one legal hurdle becomes obvious, as many national eIDs use unique
national identifiers, which could be a reason not to make eIDs available to private services. Per-
sistent identifiers as introduced in the implementing act to art. 8 eIDAS are not possible if an
eID is used for private Service Providers as well. In general it is not desirable to generate one
big usage pattern “cross-border”, involving the private sector would make it worse (e.g.: could be
linked between a financing request at a private bank and the participation in a public tender by
the same entrepreneur). The content of the minimum data set can be determined by Member
States (within the borders set by the implementing act), therefore, if a MS decides that the
minimum data set it wants to work with is comparatively large, it might be justifiable for public
purposes – but hardly for any arbitrary kind of private sector purpose. These arguments show
that data minimisation is necessary, especially for a private sector use of national eIDs. The Fu-
tureID system could be helpful in this regards, as even if the eID of Member States does not have
a data minimisation functionality and therefore provides a lot of data, the FutureID ecosystem
can solve this (reduce and integrate it to a federated IdM system). Additional possibilities are
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that although an eID may not be part of e.g. a system like the nPA, which works with domain
specific identifiers, the FutureID infrastructure can add domain/service specific identifiers, and
can take out/replace unique national identification numbers. (See also section 7 below.)
5.1.2 Other authentication means
Another factor is that customers might have a large interest in not always authenticating them-
selves using their national eID (even if data minimisation is possible). If they come from countries
which did not notify other eID means, they would under the current legislation have no choice
but to use eID means different from notified ones. To provide more user choice the interoperabil-
ity of different eID means should be fostered. FutureID can help in this regard, as it provides
interoperability of different eID means. Levels of Assurance (LoA) can also be helpful. For
self-determination one common LoA system (preferably eIDAS, as it already exists and Member
States have to indicate the LoAs when notifying) should be used and customers should be clearly
informed which LoA their identification means have and which LoAs are required to access a
certain service. Every service should indicate which the lowest necessary LoA is, and accept
all identification means that possess this or a higher LoA. This fosters self-determination, as
the customer can autonomousely decide which eID means they want to use for which service.
In future this would require a broader applicability of a single system of LoAs. A standard
assessment and a way to verify that specific eIDs indeed have that LoA would be useful.
5.1.3 Remuneration for the use of eIDs
The eIDAS Regulation leaves the choice to the Member States whether to allow private services
the use of national authentication schemes or not, including possible terms of access. This could
possibly result in many different terms and costs of access. In this regard, the FutureID Broker
system might be additionally useful, as it could negotiate terms of access, and possibly flatrates,
for the authentication service. Such a negotiation is out of the reach of single SPs which do not
have a high amount of authentication requests, could not request. Additionally it would simplify
the use of national eIDs for SPs, as they do not have to contract with every Member State, but
can simply have one contract with a FutureID Broker, which will have the appropriate contracts
with the different Member States to ensure that the Broker can use their service.
5.2 Responsibilities of parties
The responsibilities of the different parties within identity federations are not specified by law.
Therefore contractual agreements are necessary. However, these require negotiations, using time
and money, and might be disadvantageous for certain parties. A solution could be standard
contractual clauses as they exist for data processing between MS and third countries. These
could for example address jurisdiction agreements and (if the GDPR is coming) agreements on
the competent DPA.
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5.3 Company authentication
The eIDAS Regulation allows for the use of eSeals (signatures of legal persons), but factually
employees often need to use their private eID to sign, as legal persons usually do not have eIDs.
This enables links between private and professional use of the eID of employees. Therefore it
is desirable to have other means. The employee IDs already existing in many bigger companies
could have such functionality and be connected to the existing infrastructure by using FutureID.
The eIDAS Regulation lays the legal foundation by introducing “eSeals”. From a labour law
point of view with the introduction of eSeals it is doubtable whether employers can oblige their
employees to use their private eIDs for professional purposes, i.e. sign documents on behalf of
the employer. Having said this, the provision of eSeal means bound to legal persons lays the
(legal and factual) foundation for fostering the use of eTrust services in cross-border business.
Additionally, from a data protection point of view, in some cases it is irrelevant for the recipient
to identify the employee who signed, if he just can be sure that the document is signed in a
legally binding manner. The disclosure of the employee’s name, consequently, is an unnecessary
disclosure of personal data. The provision of eSeal means for legal persons is a market, too.
Contrary to the situation with eIDs for citizens, the Member States are not competent to issue
“eIDs for enterprises”. However, such registers or services already exist in some regions or
countries, e.g. the eHerkenning system in the Netherlands. In this context, a future research
topic could be to develop a technique which allows internal identification of the signee without
revealing his identity to the recipient.
5.4 Man in the middle
The threat of creating a big “man in the middle” is a principal problem in IdM solutions.
FutureID provides the possibility of employing multiple brokers, therefore diminishing the in-
formation every single Broker can have about the user. It should be ensured that the system,
when deployed, will not rely on one single broker. The issue and a technical solution have been
explained in detail in section 7.3 (Lessons Learnt from the Privacy Evaluation). From a legal
point of view, the recommended decentralised system will require a contractual chain of liability.
Here it is important that the broker that is in contact with the user cannot completely exclude
liability for failures.
5.5 Logging
Logging is necessary, especially to be able to provide proof in case of claims. However, logs can
include personal information and are therefore seen critical from a privacy point of view. At
the same time, in order to be able to use logs as evidence, is it important to be able to prove
that the logs have not been tampered with. Therefore, future research should consider privacy
friendly logging solutions.
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5.6 Sensitive Data
In the FutureID project one pilot application was extending the pre-existing epSOS network by
two additional functionalities: authentication to the system with different eIDs and electronic
signing of consent forms. The personal data processed in electronic health care systems in
general is sensitive data and additional protection is required, e.g. by implementing at least a
two-factor-based authentication like done in FutureID. Due to the sensibility of the data, the
transmission necessarily needs to be end-to-end-encrypted. However, for the implementation of
the interoperability framework as set up by the eIDAS Regulation, end-to-end encryption should
be mandatory. Otherwise, the framework will not be suitable for health related data or for any
other sensitive data (in terms of art. 8 Dir. 95/46/EC). This would needlessly limit the possible
cross-border use cases, but could be solved by setting end-to-end-encryption as standard instead
of just “facilitating” end-to-end-encryption. Furthermore, art. 6 (1) Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2015/1501 (on the interoperability framework) provides that the data exchange
and the maintenance of data integrity between the national nodes shall be ensured by using best
available technical solutions and protection practices. This cannot be less than end-to-end-
encryption at this point in time. A respective clarification could be made by the Cooperation
Network, based on art. 12 (1) (EU) 2015/1501.
5.7 Privacy by Design
All the aspects described above can more or less be summarized to the principle of “privacy
by design”, which – without going into detail – stands for system engineering with privacy in
mind. It means to technically comply with data protection law (with its principles of data
minimisation and purpose limitation as well as protection goals like transparency and interven-
ability), and even go beyond the (minimum) standards. Art. 12 (3c) eIDAS Regulation states
that the interoperability framework for the European cross-border use of eIDs shall facilitate the
implementation of the principle of privacy by design. In fact, the principle should be observed
during the design of the framework itself. In the draft General Data Protection Regulation, the
principle of “data protection by design and by default” is mentioned in art. 23. While the final
wording of this article, putting a general obligation on the controller to respect the principles,
is not agreed yet, the wording of rec. 61 apparently is undisputed: Rec. 61 states that the
protection of the rights and the freedoms of data subjects with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data require that appropriate technical and organisational measures are taken, both at the
time of the design of the processing and at the time of the processing itself, to ensure that the
requirements of the Regulation are met. In order to ensure and demonstrate compliance with
the Regulation, the controller should adopt internal policies and implement appropriate mea-
sures, which meet in particular the principles of data protection by design and data protection
by default. Although at this point time the legal text is only a draft, the consequences should
be envisaged. From a recital – in contrary to an article of a Regulation – no legal rights can
be derived directly. However, the articles have to be interpreted in the light of the recitals. An
illustrative example in how far FutureID results are relevant in this respect: Art. 5 (1 c) draft
General Data Protection Regulation provides that personal data must be adequate, relevant,
and limited to the minimum necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed;
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they shall only be processed if, and as long as, the purposes could not be fulfilled by processing
information that does not involve personal data. Read together with rec. 61 (privacy by design)
this means, that the service provider – as data controller – has to justify and document which
data he needs, and may not process any data beyond. If the user’s eID is unable to provide
only the appropriate data (a functionality which would be an excellent example for privacy by
design), the service provider may make use of a Broker Service which is able to strip off all irrel-
evant data and still ensure the trustworthy origin of the information. This would require that
the Broker (as a third, independent party in this scenario), which is trusted by the user and the
service provider, will delete all the information received immediately after the information is not
needed anymore for the transfer. This can also, in accordance with the principle of privacy by
design, be implemented as an automatic deletion function. Like this, at least the shortcomings
of “traditionally designed” systems could be mitigated.
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6 Strategic Benefits of FutureID
The following describes the strategic benefits for various stakeholders:
6.1 Users
• Thanks to the intermediation patterns of FutureID, users can reach a critical mass of
services with a single credential. This renders the possible effort of obtaining, installing
(e.g. a card reader), using (e.g., remember a PIN), and renewing a credential worth-while.
• Users can therefore use fewer credentials to reach the services they need.
• By rendering trustworthy credentials interoperable with a wide range of services, users can
reduce their reliance on passwords that render them vulnerable to attacks and potentially
permanent damage resulting from identity theft.
• The user-centered information and interaction flows of FutureID put users in control of the
authentication process and empower users to give preference to trusted identity providers
and brokers and avoid untrusted ones, optionally by cancelling the authentication process
before untrusted parties receive any personal information or meta data.
• FutureID has developed the concept where users can enforce their own privacy protection
by requesting brokers to create pseudonymous identities, minimize the exposed data even
when using “full-disclosure” eIDs, and applying patterns that render profiling impossible.
• FutureID renders more services accessible to owners of privacy-friendly attribute-based
credentials through the possibility of using broker services that interface privacy ABCs to
traditional service providers who lack support for this technology.
• FutureID provides users with a consistent user experience across a very large number of
credential types and across all service providers. This renders much more transparent to
users what happens, who gets to see personal information, and how the process can be
controlled.
6.2 Service Providers
• Service providers can use the intermediation capability of the FutureID infrastructure to
reach out to a virtually unlimited user base and arbitrary credential types.
• Service providers have full control of which credential issuers, identity providers and broker
services they trust at what level of assurance.
• Service providers faced with needing to support a wide range of digital identities, multiple
authentication protocols, and multiple federation dialects can outsource this complexity
to broker services.
• FutureID creates an open marketplace for such broker services such that service providers
benefit from competition and avoid lock-in.
• FutureID permits contractual agreements with broker services that can integrate service
level agreements and regulate liability.
• In business branches where trusted third parties already exist, these can operate FutureID
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broker services and act as trust scheme authorities. This avoids the need that service
providers are forced to disregard established trust relationships since the required service
can only be offered by new, unknown entities.
• Since the operation of broker services is market-motivated and no central control, registra-
tion, or third-party infrastructure configuration is needed, also service providers operating
in niche markets are likely to find the necessary offerings of broker services.
• Due to the market-oriented nature of the FutureID infrastructure and its avoidance of
lock-in to specific broker services, service providers’ investment is much better protected.
• Mission-critical services can contract multiple distinct broker services in order to guarantee
availability of the service.
• Service providers in need of using government notified eIDs while still needing to support an
existing user base with non-notified electronic identities can use FutureID to access both,
notified identities through STORK and non-notified ones through direct authentication or
external identity providers.
• For security and privacy reasons, service providers can integrate non-federated direct au-
thentication of credentials with authentication through a broker while integrating both in
the same look and feel for the user.
6.3 Credential Issuers and Identity Providers
• The value of credentials and federated identities to users and service providers is drastically
increased through the intermediation pattern used by FutureID.
• Profitability of credential issuance and federation is thus broken out of service-specific silos
and can be provided through a much wider market.
• This renders the business of credential issuance and identity federation more attractive
and easier sustainable.
6.4 Providers of Broker Services
• FutureID creates a new market for broker services that support the need of service providers
to support a wide range of electronic identities that are usually accessible through a range
of different circles of trust, federation technologies, and trust schemes.
• Due to the open nature of the FutureID marketplace, broker services can specialize on
specific market segments and be competitive by targeting specific legal needs (e.g., a
given legislation and place of court), language of services (both online and in documents),
technical requirements (e.g. integration with given application server technologies), or
branch-specific business practices (e.g., liability or SLA schemes).
• Broker services can operate without the need for a third party approval, registration or
enabling service. This protects the investment and allows rapid adaptation to changes in
the market.
• Broker services can collaborate with other broker services and identity providers in order
to increase their offering of supported electronic identities beyond what would be possible
within the limits of their own capacity.
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• Broker services can operate farms of “virtual brokers” to adapt to the trust perception and
needs of individual service providers and provide custom services.
6.5 Trust Scheme Authorities
• Trust Scheme Authorities, i.e. publishers of trust lists or lists of lists, can use the FutureID
trust infrastructure to make trust lists easier to use by verifiers. This is comparable
to certificate revocation management, where it is cumbersome for verifiers to download
complete revocation lists and easy to query the revocation status of individual certificates.
A patent application has been filed for the FutureID trust infrastructure and the LIGHTest
proposal (Horizon2020 DS-5-2015) attempts to bring it to technology readiness level 7.
6.6 Policy Makers
• FutureID has complemented STORK to:
– provide interoperable identity management for electronic identities that are not no-
tified (e.g., health and health-professional cards)
– make it easy for service providers to use notified, non-notified and self-issued electronic
identities in parallel.
• With this and many other properties, FutureID significantly helps to foster the use of eIDs
and other electronic identities in the private sector.
• Thanks to the market-oriented approach and the avoidance of centralized components or
centralized governance, FutureID is arguably the first identity management infrastructure
that can scale globally. This can potentially put Europe in a leadership role for conceiving
very-large scale identity management concept that are interoperable beyond the borders of
Europe itself. A prime opportunity in this area is a potential collaboration with the United
States to develop a common vision and conceptual framework for interoperable identity
management. Trade agreements such as TTIP will require interoperability of identities
across the Atlantic in order to support the market of online services. This is a field where
Europe can be highly competitive.
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7 Lessons Learnt from the FutureID Evaluation
This section provides an exposé with the lessons learnt derived across evaluations, including
general lessons to more specific ones under technical, security, privacy, usability, socio-economic
and legal criteria.
7.1 Overall Project
This section describes the lessons learnt for the FutureID project as a whole. The discussion
is also important to put the aspect-specific lessons learnt in the right context and explains
certain lessons by making the impredance mismatch explicit that exist inherently between the
project’s work plan and the approach of requirements analysis, design and implementation, and
evaluation.
A proposal for a European project, to be fundable, must include a detail plan of work. In a
technical project such as FutureID, such a plan of work is closely linked to an initial solution of
the problem addressed by the project. In particular, in FutureID the work package and tasks
follow the structure of a preliminary architecture and its components. The description of work
thus fixes the main components and their overall functionality.
Evaluation, on the other hand, usually assumes a sequence of defining requirements, then find-
ing a solution that satisfies them, and finally explicitly comparing the solution to the stated
requirements.
The difficulty of embedding an evaluation approach into a European project stems from the fact
that there the step of finding a solution fails to be free but is significantly restricted by the pre-
existing structure of the work plan and its allocation of resources. In particular, the introduction
of additional architectural components is difficult since they lack a corresponding work package
and/or task in the description of work. The situation is similar when the functionality of a
foreseen component is changed significantly compared to the plan created in the proposal phase.
FutureID has experienced this exact difficulty that is inherent for such projects. Namely, the
preliminary architecture of the proposal and thus description of work failed to satisfy some major
requirements that were only defined in the first phase of the project. This is not surprising also
considering the multi-disciplinary composition of the requirements team that contrasts with the
reality of proposal writing where typically a single person is responsible for the preliminary
architecture.
The FutureID project therefore made a major interdisciplinary effort for reviewing and revising
the preliminary architecture in order to satisfy the stated requirements. The resulting “new”
architecture was certainly a big progress but also introduced an additional architectural compo-
nent (namely the Solver and Executor) with functionality that was not foreseen in the proposal.
It also changed and increased the functionality and thus complexity of the Broker Service com-
ponent significantly.
As expected, a full implementation of the new, improved, and more ambitious FutureID ar-
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chitecture was impossible with the available resources of the project. FutureID addressed this
difficulty as follows:
• The new architecture was described in all its potential and distinct evaluation efforts looked
at the architecture and its implementation.
• A subset of the architecture was chosen for implementation. It maximized its value on the
directly accessible market segment of smaller-scale identity management and lacks certain
functionality that is only necessary for very-large-scale deployments--a market that yet has
to be rendered accessible.
• The FutureID consortium has invested additional effort beyond the description of work to
prototype functionality that could not be implemented in the mature main components of
FutureID. This includes a prototype of an additional implementation of the Broker Service
by FHG that serves as a vehicle of experimentation and of delivering proofs of concepts
for advanced functionality. This was complemented by a prototype implementation of the
Solver and Executor component by FHG and a master thesis that explored approaches
that maximize the usability of this component.
• The FutureID implementation focuses on legacy protocols such as SAML. This greatly
maximizes the ease of deployment through reuse of existing infrastructures and systems.
In addition, the FutureID architecture also opens opportunities for new protocols with
previously unreached characteristics of accountability, privacy, and security. While these
protocols were not implemented, they were formally designed under the lead of DTU and
limited prototyping explored their feasibility with current browsers.
In summary, the FutureID consortium has found a tradeoff that both, delivers a mature im-
plementation for the currently accessible market and describes a more ambitious solution for
very-large-scale identity management for which all major uncertainties have been addressed ex-
plicitly. The actual implementation is a key enabler for successful exploitation and sustainability
of FutureID; the design of a very-large-scale solution significantly advances the field and provides
a solid basis for a road map and the identification of necessary future work.
7.1.1 Recommendations
Projects that follow a structure of requirements assessment, design, implementation, and eval-
uation should make it explicit to all participants that the fixed resources and work plan of
the project limit the possibilities to satisfy all requirements. Without such awareness, partic-
ularly project partners who are not involved in the implementation tasks may have unrealistic
expectations of what can actually be implemented and may therefore experience considerable
frustration.
The approach taken in FutureID to address this difficulty seems to be a good practice that is
recommended to be used in other projects. FutureID has attempted to address all requirements
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in its conceptual framework and architecture, while restricting the implementation to a realistic
subset that is oriented to the currently accessible market.
7.2 Security
One of the requirements of FutureID was to building a scalable, robust and secure identity
federation system on European Scale.
7.2.1 Lessons Learnt and Recommendations
Eventually, entire economies will depend on the operation of identity federation systems.
• The security evaluation shows that mostly functional requirements are applicable to the
reference architecture.
• The security requirements (D22.2) that provided the main input for the analysis were
mostly inapplicable at architecture level. In fact, many requirements are related to a
specific implementation or to a specific technical environment and they cannot be captured
at the level of abstraction of the reference architecture. The reference architecture relies
on legacy protocols such as that described in the SAML 2.0 POST/POST profile. Beyond
that, it does not specify the fault-error-failure behaviour of FutureID components or sub-
systems, which might affect security strongly. In particular, the Reference Architecture
does not specify ‘abort’ or ‘go-ahead’ conditions for its protocol runs, beyond what is
specified in the used legacy protocols. Since some security requirement are built upon
’abort’ and ’go-ahead’ conditions, these should be considered conceptually at Reference
Architecture level and not left to implementation decisions.
• More tests implemented in the testbed could have been used during the evaluation. How-
ever, it turned out that the mapping between requirements and the test cases was not
feasible. One of the main reasons was that, in the development process, there was not
an explicit mechanism to account for how the requirements were implemented in the
software. Missing the first link it was not possible to have a clear path connecting re-
quirements, software artefacts and test cases. Our recommendation is to use a rigorous
software development methodology that would allow to document clearly and effectively
the dependencies between input (requirements) and outputs (software artefacts and func-
tionalities). Automatization would have allowed to repeat the test multiple times in a
systematic manner, as the manual assessment could not completely synchronize with the
evolution of the software development of the components.
• The evaluation was performed mostly during the last year of the project. Apart from
the reference architecture that was defined at the end of the first year of the project, the
implementation and the development of pilots evolved significantly during the period of
the evaluation. This caused difficulties and uncertainties that could be partially overcome
with the help of developers. Nevertheless, especially in the last few months of the project,
when software components and pilots were released, the synchronization became increas-
ingly difficult. Again, the collaboration of the project partners was useful, but from the
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evaluators’ point of view would have been preferable to have more time to evaluate the
final, stable and finalized product after the end of the project.
• Regarding the reference implementation, three key areas were identified in need of a sub-
stantial improvement with respect to the current situation, in case an operational identity
management infrastructure would be deployed. It should be underlined, that the construc-
tion of such large infrastructure was beyond the scope of the FutureID project, which was
rather aimed at demonstrating the benefits and the technical feasibility of building such
infrastructure. The requirements on accountability, integrity and resilience were deemed
’not applicable’ for FutureID reference architecture and implementation, however will be
crucial for sustainable systems.
• Accountability means that the system keeps unalterable and unforgettable evidence of
its transactions, yielding non-repudiation, and hence creating the technical foundations for
liability in the business ecosystem that builds on the identity federation.In identity federa-
tion systems accountability is a crucial factor, as undeniable evidence needs to be given, in
several situations, including resolving disputes of any kind and criminal investigations, to
all the participants (users, identity providers, service providers, certification authorities,
public authorities). With respect to specific requirements:
– Components must ensure that any security relevant data like authentication data,
eID data, assurance level or log files are protected against unauthorized modification,
substitution, re-ordering, or deletion.
– Audit records by FutureID components or system administrators should be stored
with integrity protection in an access-restricted storage space.
– For audit events, resulting from actions of identified users, all FutureID backend
components must be able to associate each event with the identity of the user that
caused the event, in compliance with the FutureID privacy requirements.
– The FutureID backend components must be able to apply a set of rules to monitor
the audited events and based upon these rules indicate a potential security violation.
– All FutureID components that generate audit records must prohibit all entities read
access to the records except for those entities that have been granted explicit access.
– Access to all audit records by FutureID components or system administrators should
be recorded and stored with integrity protection in an access-restricted storage space.
• Integrity refers to the capacity of the FutureID sub-systems to establish the sound con-
figuration and state of its components and attest to this to other parties based on trusted
computing. A set of requirements requested that the components should have been able
to handle security relevant data like authentication data, eID data, assurance level, log
files, audit records in a way that would allow their protection against unauthorized mod-
ification, substitution, re-ordering, or deletion. Another class of requirements prescribe
integrity checks of software components, at bootstrap and in case of restart, that were
not deemed necessary for demonstrating a proof of concept but cannot be ignored in the
production environment. In detail:
– Components should be able to verify their own integrity during start up and re-start.
– Components must ensure that any security relevant data like authentication data,
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eID data, assurance level, log files are protected against unauthorized modification,
substitution, re-ordering, or deletion. The component should provide evidence, if any
of these data have been modified, substituted or re-ordered.
– The Universal Authentication Service must check the consistency of all its modules
and libraries with its APS language repository, including matching versions. The
Universal Authentication Service should check the consistency of specifications in
APS language with the general security policies, including key lengths, cryptography
parameters, and allowed protocol suites.
• Resilience refers to the capacity of FutureID to protect itself against adversarial action. A
set of requirements considers the resilience of the entire system and its fail-over behaviour.
They are meant to be applicable to an operational identity management infrastructure
deployed at the continental level, and therefore, again, cannot be applied to a reference
implementation, which cannot be compared in terms of hardware and software resources
with an operational identity management infrastructure serving a large base of users.
However, for the real infrastructure they would be crucial. These improvements will need
to be taken into account:
– Components must assign a priority to each subject in the security functionality. It
must ensure that access to all sharable resources is mediated based on the assigned
priority.
– The system must enforce maximum quotas for memory space, storage space and CPU
load that each authentication session can use during the identity federation procedure.
– The system should provide sufficient throughput to offer its services under high load,
with significant contingency to spare for unexpected events.
– The system must provide sufficient resistance against denial-of-service attacks.
– The components must integrate with intrusion detection systems and react adequately
upon detection of a potential security. For example, session termination, residual data
deletion, key destruction and security attribute expiration.
– Components must be resistant against run-time attacks that could violate their in-
tegrity.
– The FutureID backend components should be able to maintain profiles of system
usage in compliance with the privacy requirements that allow the detection of any
suspicious user activity. In case of detection of a suspicious activity, an alert to the
system administrator should be triggered. Depending on the level of severity, a user
authentication may be blocked until the detected issue is resolved.
– The FutureID backend components should have available a heuristic method to detect
well-known attacks and intrusion scenarios. Upon detection, the affected component
should inform the other components about the security violation and terminate fur-
ther service activities. Additionally, it should trigger an alert to the system adminis-
trator.
– Any confidentiality loss within one system component must not lead to confidentiality
issues in other system components.
– The system of systems that makes the FutureID infrastructure must not exhibit a
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single-point-of failure.
– The FutureID Infrastructure must implement well-defined failure modes and modes
of reduced functionality.
– The FutureID infrastructure must provide a fail-over mechanism in case of a failure.
– In case of a failure, the FutureID infrastructure must offer a graceful degradation to
an emergency mode that maintains critical functions.
– The FutureID infrastructure must provide redundancy for key components, such as
the Broker Service.
– A loss of integrity within one system component must not lead to an integrity loss in
another component or to the loss of overall system integrity.
– The FutureID infrastructure components must establish a mutual synchronization of
system timers to ensure that timeouts and time-restricted token validities are enforced
correctly.
– The integrity of system time should be checked regularly to detect any tampering
with time settings.
7.2.2 Future Work
• Scalability and dependability methods for identity federation.
• Privacy preserving accountability (related to privacy-preserving audit)
• Thus the topics of ’Accountability’, ’Integrity’ and ’Resilience’ need to be addressed in
future projects in identity federation.
• Accountability is at a tension with privacy and intractability requirements, highlighting
open problems for research.
• Privacy-preserving accountability and integrity should be topics researched.
• Resilience as been neglected for too long.
• Future architectures need to include a focus on error cases, faults, errors and failures.
• Design identity federation with high resilience and fault tolerance.
• Infuse identity federation research with insights from dependability, fault-tolerance.
• Create dedicated research for high resilience against adversarial influence on the overall
system and components.
7.2.3 Audience/Stakeholders
• Academia
• Industry
• Policy makers to establish focus on resilience.
SP/WP: all Deliverable: D12.9 Page: 36 of 52
Reference: D12.9 Dissemination: PU Version: 1.0 Status: Final
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity
Recommendations and Future Work
7.3 Privacy
We first provide a discussion of a scenario with multiple, specialized brokers that can improve
privacy. This scenario was not used in the FutureID pilots, however it illustrates the potential
of the architecture. We follow the discussion up with a review of the privacy evaluation process,
the presentation of the lessons learnt, and some recommendations.
7.3.1 Utilization of Multiple Brokers
At the core of the FutureID Reference Architecture lies the central design decision to allow
for utilization of multiple brokers. Moreover, the choice and arrangement of these brokers is
controlled by the user with support from a local or remote software component. This central
design decision has caused a large amount of discussion among the FutureID project partners
which was analysed in detail in D.12.4, section 7.1.1.5. As can be seen from these discussions,
the approach of utilizing multiple brokers in a single authentication process, especially when
arranged according to the choice of the concerned user herself, needs to be analyzed in depth,
way beyond the results that were achievable within the scope of the FutureID project.
Figure 1: The Federated Identity Do-Not-Track Pattern against Profiling.
An early discussion on benefits and issues with the flexibility of this design decision in the Fu-
tureID Reference Architecture can be found in FutureID deliverable 12.4: Privacy Evaluation,
which also outlines the so-called Do-Not-Track-Pattern approach to the utilization of multiple
brokers (cf. Figure 1). What can definitely be said given the results from the FutureID project
is that the flexibility introduced by the utilization of multiple brokers definitely has the potential
to be used in both ways: for good and for bad. The discussion on this issue was intensified by
the current developments on the legal basis of authentication of human individuals in Europe,
e.g. based on the eIDAS regulation (see below). Here, the concept of utilizing multi-
ple brokers is considered superior to existing authentication infrastructures with
centralized, single broker services. This observation is also inline with the socio-economic
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perception of the landscape of identity management systems, which does see potential for a
market of identity broker services in Europe. Moreover, existing identity management systems,
e.g. within major companies, can be utilized as brokers in a FutureID environment and con-
text, which is not directly feasible with any of the well-known pan-European identity and access
management infrastructures of today. As a general result, it was identified within the FutureID
project’s discussions on the Reference Architecture that additional efforts are required in order
to understand the impact and consequences of different use cases of the FutureID Reference
Architecture. These efforts range over all of the FutureID requirements domains, i.e. con-
cerning technical, security-related, privacy-related, socio-economic, usability-related, legal, and
accessibility-related research questions.
(Semi-)Automated Support of Data Minimization and Attribute Derivation Along
with the flexibility in terms of the FutureID Reference Architecture comes its ability to include
attribute-filtering and attribute-deriving broker services. In such scenarios, the authentication
tokens issued by the identity provider (e.g. stored on the eID token) contain more information
than are necessary at the service provider. In other authorization contexts, this would always
lead to the service provider learning about those additional attributes of the human individual
without the need to do so. Here, the FutureID Reference Architecture allows for utilization of
a feature of FutureID broker services: attribute filtering and attribute derivation. At-
tribute filtering refers to the technique of an identity broker receiving an authentication token
with many attributes, then selecting a subset of these attributes (according to what the service
provider needs to know), and issuing a new authentication token (with the FutureID broker
service being the issuer) that contains only the required attributes. Hence, in such a scenario,
all other information from all other attributes is filtered out before the authentication token is
disclosed to the service provider. Attribute derivation goes beyond pure attribute filtering, as it
refers to the technique of generalization of attribute values. Similar to common anonymization
techniques, attribute derivation techniques take precise attribute values (like location, birthdate,
etc.) as input, and derive information from these attributes that exactly match the correspond-
ing information needs of the receiving side (i.e. the service provider). For the example of
location, such attribute derivation may take GPS coordinates as input, and derive the country
(and thus legislational context) of the user as output, sent to the service provider. Similarly,
attribute derivation may be used to decide whether the user is over 18 years old, based on the
information of the exact birthdate. Both attribute filtering and attribute derivation allow for
strong implementations of the principle of data minimization, which is a key requirement in
both security and privacy domains, and also often plays a major role in business-to-business
interactions. Here, the FutureID project was one of the first that identified the capabilities of
such attribute filtering and attribute derivation techniques, and hence we consequently embed-
ded the use of these techniques into all of the FutureID artifacts. However, during the project
phase, we identified a lot of open issues associated with the utilization of attribute filtering and
attribute derivation techniques in real-world contexts. For instance, the use of unique identi-
fiers in authentication tokens allows for linkability of attributes to a degree that may render
the whole idea of attribute filtering useless, e.g. if the authentication token can be linked to
an existing dataset at the service provider that already contains the same attribute values that
should have been protected. Moreover, it is not yet clear what approach is best to match the
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attribute information needs of the service provider with the attribute disclosure incentives of
the user and the technically typically fixed attribute disclosure policies of the identity providers.
Here, many different scenarios arise, ranging from an empty set of policy options (e.g. if the
information needs of the service provider directly collide with the confidentiality needs of the
user) to a huge set of viable authentication options, in which case the problem of selection of
optimal authentication plans arises. In this context, the FutureID project has come up with
an early analysis and a set of strategies, as is described in the FutureID Reference Architecture
documentation of the Solver&Executor component, yet we identified a set of open challenges
associated with the use of this component that could not be addressed properly within the scope
of the FutureID project. Here, additional efforts in terms of analysis of different scenarios and
policy options is required in the future.
7.3.2 Specific evaluation
The challenge of the privacy and data protection work in FutureID was the asynchronous ac-
tivities that were taken place in distributed design, development and integration all over the
project. Resulting from the evaluation and the intense discussions with designers, developers,
domain experts and evaluators, we came to the overall conclusion that FutureID components
can be configured to support scenarios and business models with strong respect for end user
privacy. However, in the evaluation work that was supposed to connect the requirements to
architecture, implementation and pilot applications, we ran into a number of dilemmas and dif-
ficulties. On architecture level, many of the important data protection questions from the legal
and the PET domain were undecidable due to the architecture’s generic approach independent
from particular business models and roles. While the components and architecture provide flex-
ibility to implement strict privacy regimes with FutureID, the chosen demonstrators and their
underlying scenarios where not requesting and therefore not taking in use much of FutureID’s
potential. As the architecture and component level is implemented very flexible, we
are convinced that it can be used to implement state-of-the-art privacy. However, the
particular use case, component integrator and operator will have to configure and implement for
high privacy to reach this goal. Hence follows the objective below from this experience.
Objective/Requirement
• Prepare documentation for privacy evaluation including business model and stakeholder
roles
To enable the evaluation of all requirements, a particular business case has to be specified both on
the administrative/legal and the technical level. Stakeholders, their specific roles with respect to
the Data Protection Directive, their handling of personal information in relation to the business
model, and their particular implementation ideas including a specification of the technologies to
be used are necessary for a complete evaluation round.
We must, in addition, conclude that the available budget for project-internal evaluation did not
accommodate for in-depth analysis of the 150 privacy requirements against all pilots. Should
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a combined legal/privacy analysis succeed, the project must rely on the submission of highly
standardized contracts, service level agreements, and policies.
Lessons Learnt During development, the specific business configuration of the FutureID com-
ponents were not yet defined. However, a large number of the privacy requirements need docu-
mentation about the particular business configuration, legal roles, and business practices of the
participants in an application of FutureID.
In addition, the integration of existing background from pre-FutureID development proved to
create further challenges, as such components were not developed with the FutureID privacy
requirements in mind. In future projects, it is strongly recommended to include a project
milestone “Evaluation of background technology” into the project plan. This should happen
before any new components or specifications based on background components are performed.
Recommendations
• Document very well from the beginning of any FutureID application/exploitation project
the business configuration, the stakeholder roles, contracts and policies that establish the
business using FutureID components!
• Include a real-world application subproject with a well-specified pilot from the beginning!
• Check background technologies against the project’s objectives and the project’s internal
requirements!
• Seek exploitation projects for FutureID that have a strong privacy focus to demonstrate
the architecture’s potential!
• Develop and use highly standardized contracts, service level agreements, and privacy poli-
cies that accommodate evaluation and reduce complexity!
Future Work
• Legal: develop contractual framework.
• Privacy: Develop catalog of best-practice configurations based on “top 10 business models”
• Technology: Develop default configurations with explicit support for best-practice config-
urations.
Audience/Stakeholders Audience: FutureID core vendors/developers. FutureID future users/customers.
Supervision and certification authorities.
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7.4 Usability
One of the objectives of FutureID involved building a user-centric identity federation system on
European Scale that provide user support for privacy. The usability lessons concerns specific
evaluation lessons, user support related to privacy requirements and project organisation to
facilitate testing
• Project Management: Final deadlines for technical work should be earlier than evaluation,
to ensure readiness of the technical developments. A constantly stable, integrated, running
versions of the client in a certain environment should be ensured, to be able to test things
at all times.
• A user-centric HCI process that foresees two more iteration circles for testing the system
with end users (could be mockups) and incorporates the Usability and User Experience
assessment for the service side (i.e. being a client of FutureID).
• Defining real world/situational scenarios such that we can anticipate more real use cases
apart from the Pilots. I addition, as much real and realistic information as possible (e.g.
about privacy statements, etc.) would be an advantage.
• eID systems need to adopt a user-centric privacy-by-design infrastructure with user-centric
protocols that provides privacy goals of unlinkability, transparency and intervenability.
Specific Recommendations for Future Systems
• Create information material around eID systems: e.g. Tutorials or short Videos on accom-
panying websites, explaining the general idea behind FutureID. Users would expect this
information, but rather not directly in the client (apart from first usage). Furthermore it
should be available without the need to install software. This would even more create un-
derstanding about FutureID and facilitate further usage. This also involves investigating
user understanding of information provided to them and how to translate the information
in a format the user understands and that is that matches their models of privacy.
• Future Systems should identify and tackle a broad range of Use Cases that can be later
evaluated with users. During usability Tests users often said, that they were willing to
use such systems, only if the service and benefit would be worth it. Simple, uncritical (in
terms of security) use cases were not seen to be worth the effort of going beyond existing
solutions. Some of the mentioned services were government services, contracts, and online
payments – things that now require postal communication, access in person or other special
considerations.
7.5 Socio-Economic
The challenge identity management and eID solutions are facing is that the market for this
technology is a multi-sided market. The utility for all participants of eIDs partially depends
on the adoption by agents on the other side, which is caused by indirect network effects with
SP/WP: all Deliverable: D12.9 Page: 41 of 52
Reference: D12.9 Dissemination: PU Version: 1.0 Status: Final
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity
Recommendations and Future Work
positive feedback: if more users adopt an identity management system, more services will adopt,
and the other way around.
In order to utilise the full potential of eIDs, the technology needs to be adopted on a wide basis.
As it is a multi-sided market, this will only be achieved if all participating parties perceive
a benefit in adopting the technology. Therefore, FutureID considered the interests of all the
stakeholders involved in the eID ecosystem to facilitate economic conditions for wide take-up of
its results.
Ultimately, a FutureID ecosystem shall be viable for all stakeholders involved to support the
creation of the ecosystem. Consequently, FutureID seeks to offer low ecosystem entry costs and
to provide benefits to all stakeholders involved in the eID value chain. Hence, the FutureID
socio-economic requirements ask for the support of
• different business cases and forms of revenue generation,
• various (mobile) deployment models,
• interoperability, platform independence, and global applicability,
• value-add for all stakeholders (revenue, cost savings, usability, security or privacy benefits),
and
• price differentiation.
The FutureID socio-economic evaluation has shown that the FutureID reference
architecture fully satisfies the socio-economic requirements.
7.5.1 Recommendations
• Socio-economic viability should be a key concern for future identity federation systems.
This recommendation is rooted in the network effect and the necessity to read critical
mass to build an ecosystem with a positive network effect. This entails keeping the cost
for early adopters low and offering benefits for all stakeholders involved.
• The requirements expressed for the FutureID reference architecture should be a bench-
mark for new systems. FutureID has proposed a set of socio-economic requirements that
support ecosystem creation and shown that these requirements can be realised in a refer-
ence architecture. Hence, this research should inform future identity federation research
projects as well industry deployments.
• The actual impact of the requirements on socio-economic ecosystems asks for further in-
vestigation and quantification as future work. At this point, we don’t know yet, which of
the requirements put forward by FutureID impact the adoption and ecosystem creation
to what extent. FutureID advocates to include research work packages in future identity
federation projects to investigate these factors quantitatively.
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7.6 Legal
In a research project, the lawyers’ role hardly can go beyond general recommendations and
guidance whether a certain technique/application is compliant to the existing legal framework
(or where the trouble begins). In a final deployment many additional legal requirements might
arise. These requirements depend on the exact deployment, including how, to whom, and where
an online service or a technical component will be deployed, which at the beginning and even
during the project (except if a project would have a very limited and specific focus including the
country and service, unlike FutureID) cannot be assessed. We propose general recommendations
followed with specific ones emerging from evaluations
• For future projects it might be beneficial to decide upon a ‘most likely’ use case how
the technology might be deployed, including concrete countries, stakeholders, etc., which
then can be completely assessed from a legal perspective. This would lead to a concrete
result instead of mainly highlighting legal challenges and questions and discuss theoretical
consequences, without being able to answer them fully.
• When drafting legal requirements, this should be done separately for the different levels of
evaluation. In FutureID, the architecture, the implementation and finally the pilots were
evaluated separately. However, legal requirements that are applicable to all these stages
of development are hardly thinkable. Therefore it is recommended to draft specific legal
requirements for each artefact. Especially for architecture (and maybe implementation).
Privacy by Design might be considered a requirement (e.g. based on art. 12 (3c) eIDAS
Regulation for interoperability framework or the principle of data protection by design
included in the draft General Data Protection Regulation). However, this could result in a
significant overlap between the legal and the privacy evaluation and should be coordinated
accordingly.
• Another role can be to bring newly developed techniques to the minds of those who make
the political decisions; typically the law is referring to “best available” or “state of the
art” techniques. However, the technical development is comparatively fast and a “state
of the art” of today can cause the security breach of tomorrow. Research projects – and
especially lawyers in research projects – have the potential to bridge between policies and
technical development, and thereby help to make improved technology known to and used
by a broad public – in consequence: help to make it become “state of the art”.
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8 Research Implications
This section details our research progress in WP2.4 and its implications for the future in partic-
ular how theoretical and scientific findings can be used.
8.1 Compositional Reasoning
FutureID sought to establish a reasoning over the compositionality of cryptographic and security
protocols and more generally languages and tools that allow the analysis of complex systems that
are composed of multiple components. In scientific terms this yielded two relative soundness
results or typing and parallel composition. The research in Task 24.1 is complemented by the
development of the Authentication Protocol Specification (APS) Language. The task showed
feasibility of compositional reasoning, provided the first consideration of formats in formal models
of security protocols, showed compositionally for protocols relevant for eID, such as Extended
Access Control, and investigated vertical protocol composition for multiple layers of security and
application protocols.
8.1.1 Recommendations
As recommendations we propose
• Further research into compositional reasoning.
• To be extended to include the identity federation standards as well.
• Extend composition from protocols to systems.
• Include a systems-of-systems methodology.
8.1.2 Future Work
• Formal verification for entire identity federation systems and their protocols.
8.1.3 Audience/Stakeholders
• Academia
• Industry to pick up tools
8.2 Methods and Languages for Privacy Goals
A research objective of FutureID was to establish methods and language for the analysis of
privacy goals with formal methods, as alternative to established methods such as differential
privacy or k-anonymity. The work by DTU and UNEW with King’s College London on alpha-
beta privacy showed that new approaches to reasoning over privacy goals are possible. This
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methodology is applied to the FutureID architecture. Further, the concepts of privacy-preserving
attribute-based credentials were unified and complemented with a language framework and for-
mal semantics to describe the effects of their transactions.
8.2.1 Recommendations
• The research in FutureID suggests that further research should be pursued to explore
mechanised reasoning over privacy properties.
• The consequences of the user’s and service provider’s actions over time on the user’s privacy
are extremely hard to predict. Formal methods techniques can help there.
• There is the possibility that big data techniques could be turned on the problem of privacy-
implications of (extrapolated) actions.
8.2.2 Future Work
• Alpha-beta privacy is a promising primitive that asks for further investigation.
• Research into privacy implications of actions of multiple-actor systems of systems.
• Risk analysis for long-term privacy risks.
8.2.3 Audience/Stakeholders
• Academia
8.3 Privacy-Preserving Audits
Task 24.3 investigated privacy-preserving audit and data handling methods, early activities
focused on audits themselves, which included new mechanisms on graph signatures and topology
certification. Later activities included data handling in the sense of how data is managed by
the service provider. This involves authentication, signatures and computations on signed data.
Furthermore, this task included a new threshold password-authenticated secret sharing protocol
and efficient constructions for blind signature schemes. This research further involved design
strategies for a privacy-preserving Austrian eID system. Altogether, the privacy preserving audit
and data-handling research area has proven very fruitful.
8.3.1 Recommendations
Privacy-preserving audit and data handling seemed like an area with potential that vouches for
further investigation. Based on the recommendations from the security evaluation, we further
recommend to establish further research to overcome the tension between privacy and account-
ability. This recommendation is rooted in the need of identity federation systems to account
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of authentications for liability purposes, however, therein lies a privacy risk of profiling and
tracking of the users. Hence, we recommend to investigate privacy-preserving accountability.
8.3.2 Future Work
• Investigate privacy-preserving accountability.
8.3.3 Audience/Stakeholders
• Academia
8.4 Privacy-Preserving Revocation
Task 24.5 was to establish multiple privacy-preserving revocation mechanisms. Those are crucial
to enable privacy-enhancing authentication methods, such as anonymous credential systems,
and be able at the same time to revoke lost or stolen credentials. FutureID proposed a new
privacy-preserving revocation mechanism for attribute-based credentials that allows the system
to effectively handy multiple revocation lists. This study further includes the enabling primitive
of cryptographic accumulators. Furthermore, FutureID proposes means to use epochs to gain a
balance between practical revocation and reasonably strong privacy guarantees.
8.4.1 Recommendations
FutureID made advances to the field, yet privacy-preserving revocation remains a daunting topic.
We recommend to pursue further research on this topic to seize the ultimate prize of a privacy-
preserving revocation scheme that works on a European scale and can accommodate the likely
revocation rates of such a system.
8.4.2 Future Work
• Large-scale privacy preserving recommendation systems with high revocation rates.
• Research in alternative mechanisms to revocation, apart from dynamic accumulators and
epochs.
8.4.3 Audience/Stakeholders
• Academia
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8.5 Usable Privacy
An objective of FutureID was establishing human dimensions of security and privacy in relation
to identity federation in the widest sense. Within our research, we investigated of cognitive
and affective factors as well as personality traits on security decision making. This showed
cognitive effort requirements of privacy decisions, showed impact of cognitive depletion and
traits on password choice. We elicited user models of privacy and observed the influence of affect
(expressed or observed emotions) in user models of privacy vs. sharing. We also assessed the
feasibility of psycho-physiological measurement methods for security and privacy. Furthermore,
we have designed a two-factor authentication scheme for usable server-based eID and signature
solutions, based on a challenge-response approach
8.5.1 Recommendations
• Human dimensions are crucial for security and privacy of identity federation because they
have a high impact on decisions and behaviour and need further research.
• Need more research in evidence-based methods in human dimensions of security and pri-
vacy. There is currently a gap in rigorous, reproducible and re-usable components in the
area and foremost requires foundational research.
• Support research for cognitive, affective and trait aspects of security and privacy as these
human states are seen to influence decisions and place users in a vulnerable state.
• Infuse usable privacy with psycho-physiological measurements and eye tracking which pro-
vides a complement to self-reports that depends on user interpretations.
8.5.2 Future Work
As future work we propose investigation of:
• What influences the user’s trust in an identity federation system?
• What human dimensions make a difference for the usability of privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies?
• How can PETS and identity federation systems be designed accounting for those human
factors?
• How to to make usable privacy and security a dialogue between systems and users rather
than a monologue?
8.5.3 Audience/Stakeholders
• Academia
• Industry to pick up recommendations on policies
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9 Recommendations
While FutureID has produced mature products for smaller-scale identity management that can
be sustainably exploited by Partners, arguably its most important result is probably its
architecture and unique experience of very large-scale identity management. This
experience distinguishes itself with unprecedented, potentially global, scalability. In comparison
to pilot projects of the U.S. NSTIC initiative that were all limited in scale, FutureID attempts to
provide the flexibility and scalability to reach much further; in comparison to STORK, FutureID
provides the characteristics necessary for private-sector uptake, supports all potential current
and future credentials, and avoiding central control or agreements, can scale well beyond the
boundaries of Europe.
This most precious result of FutureID, due the current lack of a market that can sustainably
support it, requires support by policy makers in order to be exploited to its fullest potential.
Different kinds of support actions are described in the following:
• FutureID technology has already be included in the eSENS large scale pilot as part of the
epSOS e-health component. But this does not cover all components of FutureID that are
necessary for its approach to very large-scale identity management. Most importantly it
doesn’t include the mature broker service component that is, as determined by the DoW,
a proprietary component owned by a project partner. The FutureID projects has however
produced less mature open source implementations of all components, including the broker
service. eSENS’s mandate to render components more mature for later use in CEF could
very well be applied to bring the open source version of all components to an
operational level of maturity. This work item could be seamlessly integrated into the
extension of eSENS that is currently being discussed and without the need to add addi-
tional partners to the eSENS consortium since the existing partner Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft
is also copyright holder of these open source FutureID components. The resulting open
source implementation is a prerequisite for several of the following recommendations.
• The main identity management component in CEF is STORK. We propose that Fu-
tureID is a necessary complement to STORK to deploy an interoperable identity
management solution in all strategically important sectors. In particular, the integration
of FutureID as an complementary identity management component in CEF
would, among others, identity-enable the following sectors:
– e-Health: While several member states issue electronic health professional cards
and/or electronic health cards to their citizens, these are unlikely to be notified within
eIDAS and thus be supported by STORK. Since interoperable use of health-related
electronic identities is crucial to applications such as epSOS, FutureID would be
an ideal solution to bring Europe-wide interoperable management of health-related
identities.
– private-sector uses: Certain private-sector players, such as banks, have a strong
need for secure and trusted identities and are therefore ideally suited to use eIDs via
STORK. Since their need predates the availability of STORK however, and to cover
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customers not in possession of some notified eID, these private-sector players have
typically already rolled out their own identity tokens. A simple replacement of this
existing solution with STORK is not possible, since it would disrupt service for the
existing user base. These private-sector players will therefore only take up STORK
if it comes with an vehicle to support the existing electronic identities in parallel.
FutureID is an ideal vehicle for this need since it can support arbitrary credentials
and already integrates STORK.
• FutureID has conducted pioneer work with its multidisciplinary team designing a so-
lution for very large-scale identity management that integrates a wide range of
viewpoints. Particularly non-technical viewpoints like socio-economic aspects, legal as-
pects, privacy-aspects, usability and inclusion received ample attention. All these points
of view were integrated in a shared vision across participating disciplines and were for-
malized in the FutureID architecture that was created in several revisions until all major
concerns were satisfied.
This multidisciplinary work identified remaining gaps between the current implementa-
tion of FutureID and the demanding needs of very large-scale identity management. Since
not foreseen in the DoW, resources were insufficient to fully implement these unforeseen
items within the project. FutureID has already conducted research and where pos-
sible even implemented research prototypes to better understand these remaining
issues and specify in detail how the remaining gaps have to be filled.
In this context, we recommend to support the necessary work to close these few
remaining gaps and thus significantly increase the overall value and obtain a
system with full support of the stringent requirements of very large-scale identity manage-
ment.
• Arguably, the FutureID architecture and implementation define the cutting-
edge in very large-scale identity management. In particular, we believe to have been
the first initiative to find ways to achieve certain key characteristics that are for example (i)
necessary to deploy such a system interoperably also in regions beyond Europe or (ii) to be
attractive in private-sector business environments. An example for such a characteristics
is the absence of central components or control--a prerequisite for the acceptance in more
than one region (e.g., North-America); another example the “self-configuration” of the
FutureID infrastructure without the need of registration or approval--a prerequisite to
attract private-sector investments by avoiding risky dependency on third parties.
Very large-scale identity management is inherently a global problem and no single regional
solution will be able to survive in isolation. To fully exploit the potential of FutureID’s
pioneering work, its results have to be promoted beyond Europe and contribute to a
common solution that involved other regions.
We therefore recommend to support the promotion of FutureID results beyond
the borders of Europe. The following illustrates how this could be done with the United
States:
– The United States, like Europe, perceives very large-scale identity management as a
key enabler for societal and economic development.
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– Through the NSTIC initiative and other efforts, this topic already receives ample
attention.
– Initial verifications show a significant interest by the United States to discuss a com-
mon vision and conceptual framework for very large-scale identity management with
Europe.
– The FutureID experience represents an ideal basis for contributing to a common vision
and conceptual framework.
– We therefore recommend to exploit this current interest and support the creation
of an adequate forum between the United States and Europe to create a
common vision and conceptual framework for an interoperable large-scale
identity management across these regions.
∗ This could prepare for a later joint standardization of these concepts and corre-
sponding architectural components.
∗ The open source implementation of FutureID may be a suited vehicle to prototype
and verify such a standard.
• FutureID represents a high potential for private-sector identity management, typically in
combination with STORK that provides support of government notified eIDs. We recom-
mend to support an explicit effort to promote the uptake of FutureID/STORK
in the private sector. This could include the following actions.
– Provide an off-the-shelf open source distribution of FutureID and STORK compo-
nents, including the necessary promotional and training resources, that is specifically
geared to the needs of private-sector players. This could for example, be done in CEF
(see above).
– Identify high-profile champions where this solution can be verified, improved, and
fine-tuned.
– Support the first high-profile private-sector players to deploy this FutureID/STORK
solution and thus create success stories.
– Use these success stories for promoting general uptake of the solution in the private
sector.
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10 Roadmap
FutureID has been highly successful and has produced a lot of important results. The following
describes steps necessary to roll out a Europe-wide identity management system in support of
the single market of services based on FutureID results.
• For a large-scale uptake across business sectors, provision of an open source reference
implementation of all FutureID components is crucial. In accordance with the DoW,
some major FutureID components such as the broker service have been implemented as
proprietary solutions. Beyond the DoW, FutureID has also produces less mature open
source versions of all components. To evolve them to an operational maturity level and
render them downloadable from the FutureID portal would be a major milestone in the
general rollout of FutureID in the large-scale identity management market.
Among the benefits of an open source version of all FutureID components are the following:
– independence of a single vendor / competition
– easy systems integration
– easy extension to meet specific needs (such as broker backends for yet unsupported
federation dialects)
• Fill the few remaining gaps to fulfill the requirements specific to very large-
scale deployments. (See Section 4). Examples for these gaps include the following:
– Support for full accountability that is an enabler for liability management in large-
scale situations where several actors could be responsible for wrong doing in a single
transaction.
– Support for privacy-by-design as protection for European citizens and mitigation of
large-scale tracing and profiling.
– An identity selector strategy that remains easy to use in presence of a massive number
of potential credentials.
– An identity selector that informs user about privacy implications of their choices in
an easily understandable and usable way.
• To further ease large-scale rollout, a formal and desirably international standardization
of all FutureID components will provide the following benefits:
– Significantly increase acceptance by the various stakeholders.
– Facilitate commercial software vendors to offer proprietary implementations of Fu-
tureID components.
– Foster acceptance of FutureID beyond the boundaries of Europe.
• Build a European community to support FutureID beyond the current consortium.
This community shall support the roll-out of FutureID/STORK solutions and govern its
further development. The community includes the following groups of stakeholders:
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– Public and private-sector service providers
– Commercial software vendors and integrators
– An open source community in support of the open source reference implementation
• Integrate the FutureID experience and results into a global vision of inter-
operable large-scale identity management. This requires the involvement of key
extra-European stakeholders.
• Support first high-profile deployments of the technology addressing:
– service providers who need to support additional credentials in addition to those
supported by STORK
– academic networks such as Geant with its eduroam
– meta-federations in fields such as banking or automotive operated by existing orga-
nizations dealing with inter-banking issues or industry-wide data and trust networks.
• Encourage uptake by software industry and integrators to implement the FutureID stan-
dard in commercial products
• Establish privacy-preserving and highly resilient identity federation research to
complement the FutureID Framework. This research shall enable key ingredients for for
future identity federation systems:
– advanced privacy-preserving accountability, integrity of all FutureID components, and
high resilience against adversarial action.
– full integration of privacy-enhancing attribute-based credentials towards end-to-end
privacy-by-design.
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